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CHAPTER I - GENERAL AND INTRODUCTORY 
Definition of the Problem 
In 1938 the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced in 
Parliament that the ultimate political goal of Britain's colonial 
policy in Africa was self-government within the Commonwealth. This 
policy in the postwarl period has been implicitly modified to allow 
for self-government or independence outside of the Commonwealth. As 
a stated ultimate objective of colonial policy it did not represent 
an essentially new orientation, but rather was an extension to Tropi-
cal Africa of the political goal implicit in British colonial consti-
tutional development. In nearly all African territories the political 
structure of legislative and executive had been established. The 
achievement of self-government through the gradual liberalization of 
the colonial constitutions was now, however, explicitly recognized 
and African political development would clearly follow in its broad 
outline the traditionally accepted evolution that the White Dominions 
had followed and that Asian territories were pursuing toward self-
government. No one, however, foresaw the rapid social change that was 
to occur in Africa in the immediate postwar period and the political 
changes and orientation that this would give rise to. 
Essentially Britain's postwar colonial policy in Africa, 
although now wedded to the ultimate goal of self-government, continued 
1. "Postwar" and "prewar" in this paper, unless otherwise stated, 
refer to World War II. 
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to approach political and social problems within the framework of 
its traditional empiricism. That is, political change, constitutional 
building and development were considered more in the light of meeting 
immediate needs and solving specific problems, than in providing a 
definite and directed course of action for the achievement of self• 
government. Self-government remained a vague ultimate goal, and ita 
attainment was not in the foreseeable future. Britain could not or 
did not foresee the demands which were to be made by rapidly emerging 
nationalist movements. In meeting the demands of West African nation-
alists in the postwar period, British policy abruptly reevaluated its 
prior concepts of slow evolution and rule and adopted a "planned" 
policy of achieving self-government within a reasonable • if not a 
stated, period of time. This may be explicitly seen in the major 
political and constitutional changes which occurred in the Gold Coast 
constitution of 1950 and the Nigerian constitution of 1951. The 
essential characteristics of this new approach or model colonial 
policy are 1 the rapid transformation of the traditional forms of 
colonial Legislative Council into democratically sleeted Parliaments; 
universal sufferage; the introduction of a Ministerial system; an 
effort to speed up the process of Africanizing the Administration; the 
requirement that British officials regard themselves as servants of 
African Ministers, not as members of a Ruling Institution, implying 
that control of the Public Service be transferred from the Colonial 
Office to the new national Governments; the substitution of the concept 
of Local Authority for that of Native Authority; and finally • the 
the acceptance of the principle that constitutional reforms are pre-
liminaries to the granting of full independence within the Common-
wealth at an early date.2 
It has been stated that this abandonment of an ad hoc policy 
in favor of rapid political and social progress toward the policy 
goal of independence was possible because of the basic consensus of 
the population and the lack of powerful non-African minorities. 
However, in Central Africa Britain also accepted a definite policy 
goal in the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
where power was not to be transferred to an African majority as in 
West Africa. Essentially there was devolution of power to a large 
European minority, although certain safeguards were retained for the 
protection of African interests. Partnership was to be the defini• 
tive principle in European-African relations. The implementation or 
partnership within the new Federation was, nevertheless, essentially 
to be controlled by the European group. 
3 
Thus it is apparent that Britain has adopted two definitive yet 
different political goals in Africa, each or which has been controlled 
in large part by the internal situation of the territories. In West 
Africa, colonial policy has granted power of decision to African 
political leadership, while in Central Africa, political authority 
has been given in large measure to the local European minority. 
2. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London, 1956), 
PP• 40-47. 
Contrasted to these two major decisions, Britain has~ 
adopted specific definitive policy goals for Kenya.3 The general 
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goal of self-government is too vague to be meaningful to the different 
members of its disparate multi-racial population. The immediate 
question that is usually considered is: self-government for whom? To 
what racial or ethnic group does the 'self' refer? In West Africa. 
it certainly meant Africans and in Central Africa it has meant Europeans. 
What accounts for the unwillingness of Britain to define specific and 
immediate policies in Kenya? It is believed that an answer to this 
problem through analysis of the internal political and social situa-
tion will reveal not only the distinct problems that Kenya poses for 
policy, but; will suggest that the present policy of traditional 
empiricism may not be able to meet the critical problems of this 
terri tory. 4 
Method of Analysis 
In analyzing the various internal forces of the Kenya situation 
it must be made clear that the ultimate balance of power and authority 
rests with Great Britain. It is the metropolitan government which 
provides the enormous public capital required for economic development, 
as well as the armed forces to put; down rebellions and maintain security. 
3. In Uganda, however, definite policy statements have guaranteed that 
this territory will develop as an African unitary state, gaining 
political independence within the near future. In the Sudan a situ-
ation existed similar to that of West Africa. With the added 
impetus of Egyptian pressure the idea of less gradual transfer of 
power and complete independence was accepted by Great Britain. 
4. It should be noted, however, that this policy has had major suc-
cesses at other times and in other territories. 
While it is essential to acknowledge the importance of. the Imperial 
factor, this study is primarily concerned with an internal analysis 
of Kenya. This includes an examination into the power relationships 
of the three main racial groups in Kenya, a study through time of 
their respective power positions and the changes in these positions 
in the postwar period. 
A general but adequate definition of political power as used 
in this paper is that given by Franz Neumann: 
It is social power focused on the state. It involves 
control of other men for the purpose of influencing 
the behavior of the state, its legislative, administra-
tive and judicial activities ••• & · 
While this definition is adequate, it must be fitted into the par-
5 
tioular power relationships dealt with here, since societies differ in 
the manner in which political power is distributed within them. The 
traditional classifications of power structures--monarchy, aristocracy 
and democracy--are useful as general analytical tools, but the fact is 
that political structures are not in reality so neatly arranged. One 
shades off into the other with degrees of difference that cover a 
political continuum. Any of the points on the continuum may theoreti-
cally be magnified for intensive investigation, but the relative 
utility of such an analysis in a multi-racial and less representative 
contexture is decreased. In Kenya, for instance, we are dealing with 
a society that lacks same of the normal requisites associated with 
5. "Approaches to the study of Political Power,n Political Science 
Quarterly, 65 (1950), pp. 161-180, as quoted in v. o. Key, Politics, 
Parties and Pressure Groups (New York, 1953), 3rd ed., p. 7. 
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democratic government. i.e •• a general will. enlightened electorate. 
universal franchise and a vehicle for the expression of public opinion. 
In the present context. power is understood as the mixture of influences 
exercised both formally and informally in Kenya and informally in the 
United Kingdom. For example • a racial group may exercise formal 
power by sharing in the political structures of government. such as 
the Legislative Council. Council of Ministers. governmental committees. 
or local government councils. However. a racial group or a political 
action community may also possess effective control over other groups 
and institutions by extra-constitutional means. i.e •• activities in 
labor unions. political organizations like the Nairobi African Congress 
or the European Electors' Union. Both qualitatively and quantitatively 
there are gross dis pari ties between Europeans • Africans and Asians in 
the command of these influences which are the properties of political 
power in Kenya. 
This study of the internal power relationships of Kenya is 
focused on the issue of political representation because the struggle 
for power has essentially been one of translating informal political 
power into a share in the authority of the political structure. 
Through effective representation a racial group. such as the European 
settlers. may have a dominant share and influence over the exercise of 
public policy. It is precisely the importance of this share established 
through the system of representation (that is. the kind of representation 
and amount) that makes the focus of political representation paramount 
in the study of political change in multi-racial territories. The 
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Indian question during the 1920's, the issue of closer union and 
European demands for an unofficial majority, the issue of equality of 
representation in the immediate postwar period, the problems over 
parity of representation and the Lyttelton constitution were all 
major events and issues in this struggle for or consolidation of 
formal representative position. 
Kenya has now adopted a multi-racial constitution but the 
major issue of political representation has not been solved. The 
three main racial groups appear to differ fundamentally concerning a 
system of representation which would permit peaceful political advance-
ment and gain the support of all groups. In broad ideological outlines 
this struggle is between those, like the majority of Europeans, who 
believe in qualified participation in major decision making and those, 
represented by African leadership, who have apparently accepted the 
doctrine of 'one man one vote.• To date British policy has found no 
acceptable compromise between these two major views. Although the 
internal situation of Kenya in the prewar period permitted the con-
duct of a policy of empiricism, such a policy in the postwar period 
has not been able to meet the increasing demands of the political 
realities or needs of a definitive political goal. Without a con-
ception of what the nature of future authority will be, each consti-
tutional change gives rise to major controversy and fundamental 
disagreement. It contributes to instability and to the possibility of 
anarchy. 
CHAPI'ER II - ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPAL GROUPS 
The ethnic differences in Ke~a make it a classical example of 
a plural society, here defined as "a society comprising two or more 
elements or sooial orders which live side by side, yet without 
mingling, in one political unit."6 The population may be divided 
into four major groupings: African, Indian, Arab and European. 
Each has numerous subdivisions. It should be noted that the term 
"Asian" is generally synonymous with Indians in Ke~a, whether they 
be Muslims or non-Muslims. Likewise the term "European" has a broad 
connotation. 7 
African Grouping• Among the African population there are 
23 languages spoken. A brief survey o.f the different tribes shows 
four main types: Hamitic, Nilotio, Nilo-Hamitic and Bantu. The 
Kikuyu, a Bantu group, and the Luo • a Nilotic group • rank first and 
second numerically (19.5 per cent and 14.4 per cent respectively of 
the total African population) and are also the two groups that have 
been most receptive to European -ys and responsive to European 
education. 8 
8 
6. J. s. Furnivall, Netherlands India, as quoted in Attitude to Africa, 
Penguin Books: 5159, l95l, p. 48. 
7. In British Africa a 'European' means • generally, ~one who is 
white. An American in Ke~ is a European. Though most of the 
Europeans are British, there are also Poles, Italians, Scandinavians 
and South Africans (who make up 22% of the white population). In 
addition to this, Kenya Egyptians and Palestinian Arabs are called 
Europeans • though Arabs from Arabia are Asian; people from the Sey-
chelles in the Indian Ocean are European or Asian according to the 
pigment in their skin. John Gunther, Inside Africa (New York, 1955), 
P• 314. 
s. Philip Mason, "The Plural Society of Kenya," draft copy of a working 
paper for the 3oth study Session of the International Institute of 
Differing Civilizations, to be given in Lisbon, April 15-18, 1957, p. 1. 
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The African population has had a minor role in the European-
dominated political, economic and social order. This is manifested by 
a limited participation in the formal process of central governmental 
authority and lack of informal influence in the social order. 
Economically circumscribed by lack of technical skill, education and 
capital, the African's participation in the market sector of the 
economy is mall. The low African wage scale and the poverty of the 
reserves help to maintain economic insecurity and limit social mobility 
to an educated few. Limited social intercourse and non-assimilation 
into the European society prevent access to positions of informal 
influence. The color bar has multiplied the frustrations of the elite 
by limiting access to positions of prestige and wealth. To assert 
himself effectively the African must compete for power in a political 
system alien to him with little command of the prerequisites and tech-
niques of the system. In addition, there is extremely little social 
and political solidarity among Africans on a territorial-wide level. 
Although this appears a static condition, the fact is that the 
political and social role of the African is changing. It must be 
remembered that the 1925 declaration by the Imperial power that 
9 African interests were to be paramount did not affect the power 
structure of Kenya. At the most this declaration was a moral principle 
of trusteeship rather than a basis for practical politics. It helped 
to prevent European over-all control and at least gave rise to questions 
9. Indians in Kenya: Kemorand\1111 (Cmd. 1922) (1925). 
of what the developing role of the African should be in the future. 
Two decades later the goal of racial partnership replaced the early 
doctrine. 
The ability of the African to affect power relationships did 
not come about until the postwar period; in fact, not until 1944 did 
the first African Representative sit in the Legislative Council. 
Although the African wields little actual political power in the 
exercise of governmental authority, he is able to effect some changes 
by his potential strength. Prior to 1944 the only African participa-
tion was found on the local district council level, which gave him 
limited participation in matters directly concerned with his rural 
life. However, the African was able to be heard in England and have 
attention focused on his position by some representations made from 
social and political organizations, especially among the Kikuyu. 
He also found support among certain missionary groups and Europeans 
10 
who were concerned with justice for the African. In the prewar period, 
however, the Colonial Office had to be primarily concerned with European 
demands for self-government and Asian drive for equality of status. It 
was the European and Asian conflict that was the focus of attention 
and major policy. 
The marked change in the African political position in the 
postwar period is highlighted by a consistent effort to increase 
formal unofficial representation in the local and central councils of 
government. African leadership adopted both legal and non-legal action 
to achieve this end. The main African demands came to be focused on 
African parity and the achievement of a common electoral roll. 
11 
Presently the African representatives in the Legislative Council are 
nominated by the Governor from informal district council recommenda-
tions. However, provisions for African elections in the Lyttelton 
constitutional agreement have been enacted. In March 1957 direct 
African elections for their legislative representatives will take 
place. Although only approximately 125,000 Africans have been regis.; 
tered instead of the 300,000 to 500,000 estimated to be qualified, this 
number still exceeds the combined European, Asian and Arab registry of 
voters by 17,ooo.10 While the total number of registered is small, 
perhaps because of widespread distrust of Government motives, i.e., 
the electoral rolls will be used for taxation purposes and the use of 
loyalty tests for the Kikuyu, nonetheless, this electoral roll is the 
outstanding African political achievement of the postwar period. 
Though limited in application at first, it will provide a constitu-
tional vehicle for political education and action and will give mean-
ing and sanction to the views of African representatives. At the same 
time it will no doubt reinforce the communal system of representation, 
fail to promote inter-racial consensus and more sharply define the 
struggle for political power. 
The grant of this electoral roll to Africans will contribute 
to the growth and development of African nationalism, which must be 
recognized as the chief potential source of African power. Perhaps one 
of the greatest obstacles in the development cf nationalism has been 
10. Africa Digest, Vol. IV, No.4 (January-February, 1957), P• 120. 
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the small number of educated men who either sought or were able to 
function as a national elite. African political movements have been 
unable to overcome an essentially tribal identification. The most 
significant political movements were Kikuyu in orientation and appeal, 
using slogans and symbols derived from Kikuyu V!!.lues, thus having 
little effectiveness among non-Kikuyu people. The propensity of the 
Kikuyu to absorb Western civilization has had a deep effect on the 
people of that tribe.11 As a result, most of the African political 
leaders in Kenya have been Kikuyu, who could not work effectively 
within the cultural setting of other Kenya tribes. This prevented 
the creation of trans-tribal linkages among emerging indigenous 
leaders. The movements which did develop tended to become secretive, 
conspiratorial and insurrectionary, and this negative character pre-
vented the development of an African political society or nation 
state. The failure of the Labour Government and the Government of 
Kenya to recognize the changing social situation contributed to this 
revolutionary rather than constitutional means of altering the dis-
tribution of power. 
In summary, the African role is changing. The greatest visible 
political gain has been the attainment of the franchise. The important 
factor with this group is its potential rather than actual strength. 
11. See Margery Perham, "The struggle Against Mau Mau," The Times, 
23 April 19531 "The Kikuyu suffered most because their region 
pivoted upon Nairobi and was almost surrounded by European settle-
ment while they became the purveyors of labour." Compare L.S.B. Leakey, 
Mau Mau and the Kikuyu (London, 1953), pp. 57-86 for the impact of 
European penetration. 
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Though trans-tribal linkages have not come about in the past • they 
appear to be developing and assuming the nature of a vehicle of trans-
tribal nationalism. 
Asian Grouping. As a c0111111unity the small group of Arabs have 
12 played no really effective part in the political life of Kenya. Philip 
Mason writes of the Arab community: 
With few exceptions they are inclined to look to the 
Government of Kenya as a protector who will safeguard 
their remaining rights as a privileged minority. rather 
than make themselves i place in the world of the future 
by their own efforts. 3 
Tha term 'Asian' in Kenya is generally synonymous for Indians. 
whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims. The largest sector of the 
Asian community is the Indian group. of which Goans number less than 
10.000. There are two groups of Indians with subdivisions among them. 
The majority of the Muslims are known in Africa as Khojas. i.e •• 
Muslims of the Ismailiya sect. followers of the Age. Khan• heretics in 
the eyes of other Muslims. On the instructions of the Aga Khan they 
have given up traditional Indian ways and consider themselves citi-
zens of Kenya. looking to the West for standards of behavior. The 
non-Muslim Indians comprise two main groups. Sikhs and the politically 
dominant Hindus. On the whole Indians in Kenya filled a gap in the 
trading field by bringing goods to sell in African areas away from 
European contact. thus initiating Africans into a simple mercantile 
economy. 
12. The population figures for the four communities are: African -
5.815.000; Arab - 31.000; European - 52.400; Indian and Goan -
144.100; other - 5.100. These are de facto population estimates 
for 1955. Colonial Reports. Kenya 1955 (London. 1956) H.M.s.o. 
13. Mason. "The Plural Society of Kenya." P• 5. 
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In the political sphere Asian power has been declining in the 
postwar period in relation to that of the European and the African. 
The principal reason for this is the system of communal representation 
which has limited the Asian's influence in both the central and local 
government. Membership in councils of government has never been more 
than half that of Europeans and ia now about equal to the African 
number. The two ministerial posts presently assigned to Asians in 
the Council of Mini stars do not coTer significant fields • all important 
posts going to Europeans.14 
Asian ideology has been rooted in equal political and social 
opportunity for all, particularly with Europeans. Asian political 
power in the 1920's had an important voice in British Imperial politics, 
but with the granting of independence to India and the abolition of the 
India Office, access to positions of high authority has been restricted. 
With India's growing position in the Asian-Arab world, any appeal by 
Kenya Asians in that direction would confirm European anxiety over 
their divided loyalties. Attempts at political boycott and alliances 
with the Africans have failed as measures to enforce the demanded 
equality with the other immigrant community. 
Asians seek to retain their fonnal influence within the parlia-
mentary system in the face of emerging African power and continued 
14. It is interesting to note that in the present Kenya Council of 
Ministers the allocations under the Three and a Half Year Plan by 
Ministerial Portfolios (1954-1957) are as follows: of the two 
active European Ministers (one being without portfolio) - 36.1% 
of the total; of the one active Asian Minister (one being without 
portfolio) - 12.3% of the total; of the one African Minister - 0.5%. 
These expenditures are based on a three and a half year budget of 
£23.7 million. Colonial Office List 1956, H.M.s.o •• 1955. 
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European claims of dominance. Racial and religious conflicts promoted 
~ racial isolation have reduced the possibility of substantial and 
sustained political action, Economic clashes occur, but religion is 
the basis for organization and within this frame Asian political 
activity takes place. In large measure disparate religious affili-
ations prevent a united political front in opposition to European 
power, despite the drive for such a front by the Kenya Indian Congress 
and its predecessor. A limited number of positions of prestige are 
available to Asian leaders in the professions and the commercial com-
munity. Competition among these leaders has been keen, and all groups 
have used their religious influence in support of their political and 
social aspirations. Both Sikhs and Muslims sought separate represen-
tation in the Legislative Council with the Muslims succeeding in 
1952.15 European policies have for the most part fostered more dis-
sension among the Asians than unity. European settlers have not 
hesitated to exploit these divisions by favoring Muslim minorities 
against the Hindu majority, 
In summary, Asian political power is limited compared to the 
other communities. After the 1920-23 Indian question effective opposi-
tion to European domination ended. With the rise of African leadership 
and the intransigence of the Europeans, the Asian community is caught 




European Grouping. The Imperial Government invited European 
colonization of Kenya shortly after the turn of the century, largely 
to support the Uganda Railway, which opened in 1901. Lord Delamere, 
who had visited the highlands of Kenya, urged Britons to take advan-
tage of this valuable land. As a result upper middle class British 
and a large number of South Africans, affected by the depression fol-
lowing the Boer War, were among the early European settlers. Under 
the forceful leadership of Delamere the small white group elicited 
important concessions from the Imperial Government. In 1919 the 
elective principle was adopted for selecting European unofficial& to 
the Legislative Council. A heated 'Indian question' ensued for the 
next four years resulting in the establishment of the present form 
of communal representation. What Professor Dilley calls the 'campaign 
16 
of commissions' began in 1924. The first was the Parliamentary 
Commission to East Africa under the chairmanship of the Honorable 
w. Ormsby-Gore to obtain information for the East Africa (Southborough) 
Committee, one of two appointed by the Secretary of State to inquire 
into trusteeship. In 1927 the Bilton Young Commission considered the 
question of closer union of the East and Central African territories. 
Its report published in 1929 led to the sending of Sir Samuel Wilson, 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Kenya to 
achieve a plan acceptable to the Europeans, yet fulfilling the major 
rec0111111endations of the Hilton Young Commission. With the issuance by 
16. Marjorie Ruth Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony (New York, 
1937), P• 18. 
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the Government of its conclusions on closer union a Joint Select 
Committee of Parliament was appointed in November, 1930 to consider 
them. After this Lord Mayne was to study finance; Mr. Roger Gibb, 
railway rates and finance; the Carter Land Commission, native claims; 
and the Bushe Commission to consider judicial organization. The 
campaign of commissions suggests at the very least a decade of unrest 
in the dominant community at the time, the Europeans. 
The world wide depression of the thirties hit Kenya hard. 
Despite measures of retrenchment by ~overnment and private citizens 
alike, many farmers became insolvent, adding to the general grief 
of the settlers. Throughout this period the Kenya Government beoame 
the whipping boy of the European community and efforts toward self-
government ware revived during periods of major disagreement. The 
Imperial Government, however, was adamant in the 1930's against any 
major political change, despite some renewed demands on the part of 
European settlers. The income tax struggle of the thirties was used 
to establish major settler influence over financial policy in the 
Legislative Council, and to obtain a large share of influence in the 
Executive Council. 
Despite the fact that European colonists are outnumbered by 
17 
approximately 170 to 1, they are the dominant group, the one which 
17. British colonial civil servants are included in the demographic 
estimates of the European population. No clear distinction can be 
made between the permanent and non-permanent sectors of the European 
population since some local Europeans are civil servants and others 
are retired British civil servants. The permanent European popula-
tion is estimated to be 35,000. 
18 
wields the greatest power. Two main reasons for their power are: 
1) the economic superiority they possess over Asians and Africans; 2) 
close cultural links with Great Britain. Considering the cultural 
heritage of the European first, it is evident that its basis in British 
tradi tiona, values and techniques has given him an advantage in the 
pursuit of power within Kenya's formal structure of authority. The 
propensity of the British to organize effective political action in 
the constitutional process, access to and influence over positions of 
authority locally and in Great Britain, the appeal to 'kith and kin' 
in the mother country, plus an intimate knowledge of parliamentary 
rules--all have contributed to the achievement of European dominance. 
The economic superiority of the European in Kenya is due 
primarily to his technical skill and education as well as the capital 
at his disposal. He is able to use modern methods in organizing the 
factors of production and to achieve economies available only to 
large scale capital users. These have resulted in a higher standard 
of living for the Europeans than for either the Africans or the Asians. 
The average white wage is double that of the Indian and several times 
higher than the African. Stenmdng from economic superiority is the 
position of European dominance in the internal affairs of Kenya, the 
continued reservation of the WWhite Highlands" and the control of the 
largest proportion of cOllllllerce, mining and industry. The overflow of 
control into the social sphere is evidenced by the color bar in all 
phases of Kenya life. 
19 
From their initial occupation of the territory Europeans have 
considered themselves political and social elites, the only group that 
should, and from their viewpoint could, exercise authority, The 
pursuit of this ideal by aggressive attempts to control all situations 
has been the history of racial politics in Kenya. Under the dynamic 
leadership of Lord Delamere, aided by political victories over the 
Imperial Government, European belief grew in the feasibility of complete 
political-control, In part this belief was fostered by the ambivalence 
of British policy, the willingness of successive Governors to consider 
seriously and act favorably on many European demands, At no time was 
the possibility of European control positively denied, and they found 
encouragement in the granting of self-government to Southern Rhodesia 
in 1923, European self-government was a distinct possibility in 
their minds. If justification was not found in ability alone it was 
certainly due as their 'natural right.• Lord Hailey has written that 
in certain periods European settler interests "have exercised an 
influence on policy hardly less than that which they might have attained 
18 
under a fully developed form of responsible government," 
The prewar political development of Kenya was characterized by 
a drive to enlarge European influence: since World War II their efforts 
have been directed toward consolidating this hard won position. A 
detailed study of this change will be made in the next chapter. 
18. Lord Hailey, An African Survey (London, 1938), P• 383, See also 
Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the De endencies in 
Eastern an • 
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CHAPI'ER III - GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN DOMINANCE 
Two facts are paramount when considering Kenya politics: 
1) the ultimate control of all Kenya activities lies in the hands of 
the Imperial Government; 2) that Government has stated repeatedly and 
officially that eventually Kenya would obtain self-government. As 
in many other parts of the British Dependent Empire. the discrepancy 
between the men on the spot and Whitehall is in the meaning of the 
word eventual. in other words • the timing of what is assured. 
European Political Organizations. Professor Dilley points 
out that in 1902• before there was a concerted effort to colonize 
East Africa. the Colonists' Association was formed to save the high-
lands for white settlement.l9 A year later this Association was 
taken over by the Planters' and Farmers' Association. largely to 
facilitate marketing. By 1905 its interests were predominantly 
political and concerned with all the settlers • and the name was changed 
back to the Colonists' Association. With the rapid increase of settle-
ment. district associations sprang up dealing with local interests 
and in the main non-political. A certain degree of animosity prevailed 
between the small groups and the Colonists' Association until 1910 
when Lord Delamere formed the Convention of Associations to unite the 
district organizations. The older main body became the Nairobi 
Colonists' Association and a member of the new Convention. An 
19. Dilley. British Policy in Kenya. P• 36. 
Executive Committee provided continuity between the time of the 
regular bi-annual meetings. Resolutions that were adopted were sent 
to the Government as the representative view of the settlers and it 
was customary for Governors and/or officials to attend Convention 
meetings to answer inquiries. Prior to elective representation to 
21 
the legislature in 1920, the Convention was the major means of express-
ing European opinion. 
Though.the organization lapsed during World War I it was 
quickly reformed in 1918 with larger and more vocalized interests. 
A year later at a welcoming dinner for General Edward Northey, the 
new Governor, held coincidentally with an annual meeting of the Con-
vention, Major Grogan, the then President of the Convention, addressed 
the group for two hours directing his remarks to the new Governor. 
He said in effect, after outlining the aims of the Convention, that 
if the Governor cooperated with them, they would help him; if not, 
then they would actively oppose him. Up to the time of elected repre-
sentation Department Heads of the Government not only discussed 
matters before the Convention but in cases were roundly criticized. 
After the principle of elected representation was conceded to the 
Europeans, Elected Members were censured by Convention if they failed 
to consult them before making decisions. For complete cooperation, 
they were praised. Thus, Elected European Members were responsible 
both to their constituencies and to the Convention. Under the guidance 
of Lord Delamere this organization was an important factor during the 
1920's. It gave the impression that a united European front existed, 
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when actually the small commercial community was not in sympathy with 
the Convention. Because of their organization they wielded tremendous 
influence beyond their constitutional position and their numbers. 
They adhered to the basic tenet of agitation because of its effective-
ness; a spontaneous campaign of protest could be organized in a few 
short weeks.2° 
The Convention operated in much the same way as its successor. 
the Electors' Union; that is. as an active interest group concerned 
only with European ambitions. There would have been little reason 
for its existence if it could not present to the Government the 
European consensus on particular matters. Three main drives have 
dominated the workings of both the Convention and the Union: 
membership. money and issues (not necessarily in order of importance). 
The Executive of the organization knew that they could only claim 
true representation if the membership rolls were swelled. The financ-
ing of this organization took large sums of money. Deputations to 
England had to be paid for. a central organization had to be maintained• 
and a vast communication system kept up. Money came in from members 
and non-members at a rate indicative of the political temperament of 
the Colony. When major issues were in the fore. funds were easily 
available. But at other times. apathy took hold. and only minor 
financial support could be found. 
20. Mr. MacGregor Ross says that the Governors have always been sub-
servient to the Convention. This. he thinks, was partly the result 
of the vocal ability of the organization which made it easier for 
the Governor if he agreed with it.... Its unattractive feature 
has been its abuse of those officials who, in its opinion, thwarted 
it. He speaks of the Convention as the Colony's "Big Noise." 
(167 H.C. Debates 5s, 25 July, 1923, col. 521.) as quoted in 
Dilley, P• 41. 
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It may be said that neither the Convention nor the Union was 
entirely representative •. At the peak period of settler population and 
with major issues burning. the total active sustained membership of 
the Union was never more than 4.000 people. There were open splits 
at times with the Associated Chambers of Commerce and with the general 
commercial community. The agricultural group. not the commercial 
group. were the active supporters of the Convention and the Union. 21 
In the thirties the influence of the Convention of Associations 
began to decline. The depression crippled the Kenya economy and made 
active interest in politics secondary to survival. A few issues 
during this period rallied the Convention and were heard by Government. 
These dealt primarily with tax and fiscal matters. Perhaps the last 
important act of the Convention of Associations was the part it played 
in the fostering of Executive Council reorganization as a compromise 
for the imposition of an income tax. 
With the coming of World War II. political agitation and activity 
was held in abeyance for the duration. The war period witnessed a 
great surge in Kenya's economy. and the postwar period brought great 
numbers of new immigrants. However • Kenya's European population was 
becoming largely urbanized. and a new type of vigorous organization was 
felt to be needed. In 1942 a NYanza Province European Electors' Associ-
ation was formed; soon most other rural and settled areas began to form 
21. I am again indebted to Dr. Rosberg for allowing me to use material 
he collected while a Ford Fellow in Kenya. This includes files 
from 1943 to 1955 containing practically all the minutes of the 
Electors' Union meetings. plus newspaper reports on Kenya activi-
ties during the same period. This information on the Electors' 
Union is derived primarily from this source. 
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local organizations. A national organization was lacking. By 
October 1943 six Electors' Associations held a conference at Nakuru 
to discuss the need for a unified central body. An organizational 
committee of the Convention of Electors' Associations held several 
meetings to discuss the nature and role of the new territorial 
organization. Suggestions were made to make the new group an advisory 
body to the European Elected Members Organization, and to attempt 
unification with the old Convention of Associations, which was dormant 
but still possessed a treasury. Both plans failed. However, at a 
convention of Electors on March 24, 1944, attended by representatives 
of ten of the eleven European constituencies, a new organization was 
formally founded--the European Electors' Union. Among the aims of 
the Union at this time were: mobilization of European voting strength; 
to act as an advisory body to the European Elected Members; to safe-
guard the White Highlands; to increase white settlement in the colony 
by every means; and "to reiterate and press for the right of the 
white community in Kenya to be consulted by and associated with Gov-
ernment in their joint responai bili ty as trustees of Native Africans ••• n22 
It is interesting to note that in at least one respect neither 
the Convention nor the Union was effective over the years, i.e., in 
mobilizing European voting strength. Chronicles of Kenya history 
make continuing reference to the apathy of the voters in general 
elections, regardless of the period. The 1944 election was no exception. 
22. East African Standard, March 24, 1944. 
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Despite the six year tenure of the Council (extended two years because 
of the war) and the pre-election discontent, plus the tub-thumping by 
the Union for a large turnout--there were contests in only four con-
stituencies, resulting in only one defeat. Two new men came to the 
Legislature--one by contest and one unopposed. 23 Taking into con-
sideration the war, the number of troops who were away, etc., this 
is not an unusual showing for a Kenya election. The same over-all 
conditions existed in Northern Rhodesia, but there participation was 
much higher. This, it would appear, reinforces the idea that settler 
organizations lived on issues and were unable to maintain sustained 
interest in Kenya affairs even at election time. 
Since the granting of elective representation in 1920, Kenya 
has always had some sort of European Elected Member group (now known 
as the European Elected Members' Organization), a loose unofficial 
association of the Elected Members of the Legislative Council, with 
one of their own who is designated 'leader.• 24 It is difficult to 
assess the effectiveness of this organization. Much depended upon 
the personal leadership of its members--such as Lord Delamere, who 
dominated it and the Convention of Associations for years. Although 
clashes between the Elected Members and the Convention of Associations 
were rare until the postwar period, such clashes were evident from 
1945 until 1952. Their clashes have their basis in the unwillingness 
of Elected Members to be directly responsible to the Electors' Union 
rather than their individual constituencies. On the whole, however, 
23. East Africa and Rhodesia, Vol. 21, No. 1046 (October 5, 1944), p. 105. 
24. Not until 1934 did elected Europeans select a Leader and a Whip, 
agree on general policy and bind votes. Lord Delamere had been 
Chairman in the past. 
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Elected Members have always considered it necessary to account for 
their actions to this organization of public opinion. An agreement 
was reached at one time whereby the Executive of the Union would act 
as a secretariat to the European Elected Members' Organization. which 
bound the two groups closely together. 
Perhaps one example may be given to show the effectiveness 
of the Union and the European Elected Members' Organization when 
joined together in opposition to the Imperial Government. The 
matter of closer union of the East African Territories had been under 
discussion for many years. On November 22. 1945 the Governor issued 
a statement. after discussions with the Colonial Secretary in London. 
to the effect that amalgamation of the East African territories was 
not practical at this time. On December 12. 1945 the Colonial Office 
issued the document 'Colonial 191' on Inter-territorial Organization 
in East Africa. for exploratory purposes. It received a violent 
reaction in Kenya because of the suggestion that a proposed inter-
territorial assembly seat members on the basis of racial equality. 
Ten days after issuance on December 22. 1945 the majority of the 
Elected Members. through their organization and supported by the 
Electors' Union. categorically rejected Colonial 191. The balance of 
European members in the Legislative Council merely rejected aspects 
of it. The reaction that followed was the high point in effectiveness 
of the Union judged ~ the sharp increase in membership. swelling of the 
treasury and growing opposition to it from the Coast Province and the 
commercial community in general and the Associated Chambers of Commerce 
in particular. 
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Battle o£ Theories. One o£ the determinants in the present 
day evolTelllent o£ Kenya was the Indian-European conflict or the Indian 
question o£ the early 1920's. A detailed investigation into the Indian 
question is beyond the scope o£ thia work. However, the main out-
line of this clash of interests needs to be described. The Indian-
European conflict led to other considerations and to a general 
examination of the relationship of all three racial groups to one 
another in the political system. Prominent among these considerations 
were the theories and concepts of paramountcy, trusteeship and dual 
policy.25 
In the granting of elective representation to the Kenya 
Europeans in 1919 no provision had been made for Indian represents-
tion. However, in the same year Lord Milner, then Secretary of State 
£or the Colonies, instructed the Governor that the Council should 
comprise in addition to the eleven European Members • two Indian 
Members elected communally by the Indian community. This action on 
the part of Lord Milner brought into political focus the Indian crisis 
which culminated in 1923. The Indians had behind them the India Office 
and a resolution of the 1921 Imperial Con£erence favoring removal of 
Indian disabilities in the Dominions. An initial attempt at settlement 
of the matter came when the British Government accepted proposals agreed 
upon between the Colonial and India Of£ices. These provided for a 
25. The Indian question is well covered in Dilley, British Policy in 
~. cited earlier. For a thorough study of communalism in Kenya 
seelrarl G. Rosberg Jr., A Stu of Communal Re resentation in 
Constitutional stems of the British Commonwea th with ecial 
Reference to Fiji, nya and Ceylon D. Phil. thesis; ford 
University, st. Antony College, 1954) Volume I. 
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common roll with property or education qualifications so that the 
Indian voters would be limited to 10 per cent of the total voters. 
In addition there would be complete freedom of Indian immigration. 
This ~as una~ceptable to the ~ropeans, and in the spring of 1923 
Lord Delamere headed a delegation to South Africa and the United 
Kingdom to present the European case and demands. Though ineffective 
in South Africa, the London meetings resulted in an agreement which 
allowed eleven European Elected Members as before, but a total of 
five Indian Members elected on a communal franchise. 26 The White 
Paper which set forth this settlement stated, after reviewing the 
history of the problem, that both Indian and European communities 
agreed that it was important to safeguard the interest of native 
Africans •. The White Paper stated that: 
Primarily • Kenya is an African territory • and His 
Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to 
record that the interests of the natives must be Kawh-
mount (underscoring the author's) and that if, an en, 
those interests and the interests of the immigrant 
races should conflict, the former should prevail •••• 
But in the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Govern-
ment regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf 
of the African population, and they are unable to dele-
gate or share this trust, the object of which may be 
defined as the protection and advancement of the native 
races.27 
Among other things the paper precluded any thought of self-government 
in the foreseeable future. 
26. Indians in Kenya, Memorandum (Cmd. 1922) (1923), called the 
Devonshire Paper after the then Colonial Secretary. 
27. ~· • p. 9. 
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From the above declaration stems what has been called the 
battle of ideologies. In attempting to contain the Indians, the 
Europeans became more solicitous of African interests than they 
actually were. Paramountcy carried to its logical conclusions might 
well have led to the eventual exclusion of Europeans from Kenya. 
Thus in 1924 when the Report of the East African Commission enunciated 
the "dual policy" the European community looked upon it more favorably 
than paramountcy,28 The Report stated that throughout East Africa 
the native is regarded as a child, which implies that the Europeans 
should act as guardians of the African natives. In giving this 
definition of trusteeship the Report stated that a moral duty and 
attitude is imposed upon the trustee. There is, however, another 
kind of trusteeship which the European exercises in tropical Africa: 
As Sir Frederick Lugard has pointed out ••• we are not 
only trustees for the development and advance in civiliza-
tion of the Africans, but we are also trustees for the 
world of very rich territories. This means that we have 
a duty to humanity to develop the vast economic resources 
of a great continent. There is no re~son to sup~ose that 
these trusteeships either should or do conflict. 9 
Thus in addition to the usual understanding of trusteeship, i.e., 
maintenance of peace, security and justice fer the natives, was added 
the concept of the economic development of the indigenous people. In 
28, Report of the East Africa Commission, 1925 (Cmd. 2387) (1925), P• 22. 
Professor Dilley notes that the idea of "dual policy" had been 
developed in Kenya before that of paramountcy but the term was first 
used in 1924. It actually arose over the position of the Imperial 
Government with regard to labor policy. Dilley, pp. 181-186; 234. 
29. Report of the East African Commission, p. 22. 
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this light trusteeship became an integral part of the dual policy, 
for if the native was to receive the services the trustee was obliged to 
give, he (the native) had to produce enough to provide for these ser-
vices.30 Dual policy was discussed in various White Papers and by 
several Commissions during the balance of the 1920's. In the final 
analysis the idea of dual policy gained acceptance over that of 
paramountcy. 
Allied to dual policy but distinct from it was the concept of 
dual trusteeship, i.e., Europeans in Kenya should share with the 
Imperial Government the trust for the interests of the natives. 
Though never formally expressed prior to the publication of the 1927 
White Paper,31 it was implied in the demand for a European elected 
majority in the Legislative Council. Though an elected majority was 
not granted until 1948 it was one of the main drives toward ultimate 
self-government and is intricately tied up with the political develop-
ment of Kenya. It was inconceivable to the settler that he should 
undertake an elected majority without at least sharing in, if not 
taking over, trust commitments of the Imperial Government. In this 
vein the Europeans were encouraged by the 1927 White Paper,32 which 
30. This development of the complex concept of 'dual policy' is 
based partly on Rosberg, Study of Communal Representation, 1954. 
31. Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa (Cmd. 2904) (1927) 
32. There were three official statements of policy in East Africa 
after 1920 which are known as White Papers: Indians in Irenya 
(Cmd. 1922) (1923), previously cited; (Cmd. 2904) (1927), cited 
above; and Memorandum on native policy in East Africa, (Cmd. 3573) 
1930). 
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recommended that the colonists be associated with the e~ution of 
this trust. Mr. Amery, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
favored such an association. But the Hilton Young Commission33 did 
not affirm the principle of dual trusteeship. In 1930 Lord Passfield, 
the Labour Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated in Memorandum 
on Native Policy in East Africa that the responsibility for trustee-
ship could not be devolved. The abrupt change is due partly to the 
Labour Government which was then in office. In the next year Lord 
Passfield did not greatly clarify the issue when he told the Joint 
Select Committee that he accepted the 1927 White Paper which granted 
association in trusteeship to the resident European community. He 
said, "There is no departure intended in the White Paper of 1930 
from the White Paper of 1923.... I am in a position to say that the 
White Paper (1930) does carry out the 1927 White Paper in so far as 
it differs from the 1923 White Paper:34 It is somewhat difficult to 
reconcile this statement with the other White Papers. The Joint 
Select Committee in 1931 recommended that the responsibility for 
trusteeship should be retained by the Imperial Government but it 
accepted the principle that non-natives should increasingly be associ-
ated in the discharge of the trust. 
33. Named after the chairman of the Commission, it issued the Report 
of the Commission on Closer Union of the De endencies in Eastern 
and Central Cmd. 3234 1929 • 
34. Joint Select Committee: Minutes of Evidence, H.C. Paper No. 1956, 
1931, Vol. II. 
This appears to be the last official pronouncement on dual 
trusteeship. 35 The ideal, however, had not been dropped by the 
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Europeans. In the postwar period the European Electors' Union 
declared it to be their right to "associate with Government in their 
joint responsibility as trustees of Native Africans." 
Raving touched on the different problems and theories for 
action which arose in the 1920's, it is well to note again that they 
are inextricably tied up with both the demand for an elected European 
majority and the movement towards a union of East Africa. The Vlhite 
Papers issued at this time and the very 'campaign of commissions' 
had as their central goal the clarification of Kenya problems. The 
problems were indeed pressing, or at least made to look so by the 
vocal European minority. It is doubtful that the Imperial Government 
and the House of Commons would have given the matter such constant 
attention unless it was thought to be urgent. It is likely also that 
the economic depression of the thirties was a welcome political 
breather in the movement towards European demands. The effective-
ness of the Joint Select Committee cannot be overestimated; its most 
important contribution was that it said nothing new, apparently just 
what all 'contestants' wished to hear. The exhaustive nature of the 
Committee's Report left little to be desired in the field of investi-
gation. As for union of East Africa, the Committee said that "this 
is not the time for taking any far reaching step in the direction of 
35. Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, Vol. I, 
Report (H.C. Paper No. l56) (1931). p. 28. fhe pertinent references 
to the House of Commons Papers are found in Rosberg, Study of 
Communal Representation, Chap. V. 
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formal union." As mentioned above the Committee recommended that the 
responsibility for trusteeship should be retained by the Imperial 
Government. Concerning the Kenya Legislative Council the Committee 
recommended the maintenance of an official majority and the continu-
ation of the communal basis of representation. In effect East Africa 
made no progress in the solution of its difficulties and stood 
approximately at the same place it did in January 1927. Professor 
Dilley sums up the two principal issues adroitly: 
The Europeans urged closer union in connection with an 
elected majority for themselves in their Legislative 
Council but • when the tables were turned and an elected 
or unofficial majority was considered to be feasible 
only if there were some central authority with power in 
certain fields to maintain Imperial interests, they 
ceased to be interested.36 
It may be added to the above quote that they ceased to be interested 
'pro tem. 1 
As mentioned before, the income tax struggle of the 1930's 
was the signal for renewed demands of European elected majority. It 
was in July 1932 that the Imperial Government introduced an income 
tax measure and the settlers replied with 'taxation without represen-
tation. 1 When it was found that the Imperial Government was adamant 
in its stand against an unofficial majority • the European connnuni ty 
acted to circumvent the normal channels of political development by 
pressing, quite openly, for European control of the Executive branch 
of government, in that way establishing themselves securely in a 
36. Dilley, P• 84. 
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dominant position. The first major step in this direction was taken 
in August 1945 when Major F. W. Cavendish-Bentinck, a European Elected 
Member • was made Member for Agriculture • Animal Husbandry and Natural 
Resources, assuming that portfolio in the Executive Council. 
In this period Indian claims were predominantly defensive, 
urging the adoption of the common electoral roll. The African com-
munity was dormant. The issue of closer union was more an academic 
problem by the late 1930's. Each of these factors is further dis-
cussed in the following chapter dealing with the postwar period. 
CHA.PrER IV - POSTWAR KENYA: EUROPEAN CONSOLIDATION 
It can be very generally said that the predominant theme in 
postwar Kenya politics was the institutionalization of the European 
power position. But like any generalization, this leaves a great 
35 
deal unsaid. Depending on the definition given to 'postwar period' 
another unmistakable development was the emergence of limited African 
leadership. European political power had to be more and more concerned 
with the emergence of African leadership and the potential represented 
by incipient African nationalism. 
European leadership in the postwar period came to the conclusion 
that the possibilities of gaining control of the legislature were 
limited. The possibility of gaining control of the Executive Council 
offered a fruitful avenue of exploration, but it was vital that the 
system of parity of representation between European and non-European 
interests in the Legislative Council be maintained. The issue of 
parity of representation became a major one and plans for European 
over-all control in the Executive Council were abandoned, although 
not ~orgotten. 
Clo·~rer Union - The End of a Struggle. The twin issues of 
closer East African union and European elected majority made up the 
fabric of Kenya political life from the mid-20's until 1950. If one 
were to weigh the wordage spilled on these two questions it would 
probably outbalance all other issues combined. The idea of closer 
union became significant when Tanganyika came under British control 
after the first World War. It was initiated by the Imperial Govern-
ment and thought to be economically feasible. Although occasional 
meetings had been held since 1919, the first formal conference of 
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East African Governors took place in Nairobi in 1926. Mr. L. s. Amery, 
then Colonial Secretary, was actively interested in closer union and 
spoke of "the ideal of a united East Africa." Lord Delamere originally 
opposed the idea, but when he sensed its inevitability he tied the 
essential qualification of an unofficial European majority in the 
Kenya Legislative Council to any move toward closer union. The matter 
remained in generally this position until 1945. It had survived the 
'campaign of commissions' and the decade of the thirties with little 
more effected than the recommendation of the Joint Select Committee 
that there be established a Joint Inter-territorial Secretariat and 
regular Governors' Conferences. As mentioned earlier, it remained 
an academic question throughout the 1930's, although in 1934 and 1935 
resolutions were passed by Europeans in both territories urging that 
circumstances had so changed as to render the early union of Kenya 
and Tanganyika desirable. 
During the war years, through the medium of the Governors 1 
Conference and its Secretariat, a large degree of cooperation and 
common action existed among the three territories, indicating not 
only the feasibility of union but in some instances providing the 
instrument to carry out a particular function. In December 1945, 
as mentioned above, Colonial 191 on Inter-territorial Organization in 
East Africa was issued 'for discussion only.' It proposed the creation 
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of an East African High Commission made up of the three Governors 
of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, a permanent Secretariat to cor-
relate common inter-territorial services, mainly economic. In 
addition an East African Central Assembly was proposed which would 
seat nominated members and representatives elected by the unofficial 
Members of each Legislature in a ratio of one European, one Indian 
and one African. The proposal made explicit the point that if accepted 
the political fusion of the territories would not be involved. The 
furor caused by the submission of this proposal was discussed above. 
Several reasons were given, but the 'categorical rejection' was based 
mainly on the proposal of equal representation. The Electors' Union 
began an active campaign to oppose the proposal and backed unanimously 
the categorical rejection. The proposal was called a frontal assault 
on the European position in Kenya, although it was found acceptable 
in Indian and African quarters. In contrast to the high degree of 
unanimity on rejection, there was very little forthcoming in the way 
of counter proposals that all could agree on. It was not until May 
of 1946 that alternate proposals of the European Elected Members were 
published. The principal suggestion was that a Standing East African 
Council be appointed, with a Secretariat, for a period of four years 
initially, and that unofficial members of the Council be nominated 
by the territorial Governors, not elected. The East Africa and 
Rhodesia in an editorial termed the alternate proposals a "negation 
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of statemanship." The East African Standard maintained them to 
37. East Africa and Rhodesia, May 30, 1946. 
be unworkable, while Mr. S. V. Cooke, Elected Member from the Coast 
Province said they were "monstrous and fantastic."38 The alternate 
proposals caused an open rift between Coast and commercial elements 
on the one hand and the upland representatives on the other, for 
:sa 
there ware important economic benefits to be gained by the commercial 
community through the creation of a High Commission. The commercial 
community also believed that the agricultural sector of the popula-
tion had reacted irrationally and could think only in terms of the 
status quo. A sub-committee of the Electors' Union meanwhile drew 
up and approved a complicated new constitution that insured European 
predominance. 
In the summer of 1946 Mr. A. Creech-Jones, the Under-Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, toured East Africa and met with various 
groups endeavoring to dispel fears and calm the agitation which had 
arisen. In 1947 revised proposals of the Imperial Government were 
publishad.39 These provided for a Central Legislative Assembly 
composed of a Speaker, seven~ officio members who would be officers 
in the High Commission, three nominated official members, one from 
each territory, and four members appointed from the unofficial side 
of each Legislature, one each Indian, African and European, while 
the fourth would be an at-large member representing all the unofficials. 
Although the European community was generally in favor of the revised 
proposals it was felt that their position in the Legislative Assembly 
:ss. East African Standard, May 17, 24, 1946. 
39. anisation in East Africa, Revised Proposals 
Col. No. 210 
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would be jeopardized by an increase in the non-European representation 
in the Legislative Council. With the Governor's announcement that an 
unofficial majority might be linked to the revised White Paper, and 
that the fourth member would be a European, European opinion solidified 
behind the proposals. Although the Imperial Government denied it, 
the principle of equal representation had been abandoned. The Indian 
and African communities were opposed to the revised plan; the East 
Indian National Congress called the new White Paper "this unhappy 
surrender" and a victory for the Europeans. 1'he Governor, Sir Philip 
Mitchell, proposed that the official members of the revised Kenya 
Legislature should number 16 and the unofficials 22, consisting of 
11 Europeans, 6 Indians, 4 Africans and 2 Arabs. There would also 
be a speaker of the Legislative Council. 
African representation was considered at this time as part of 
the general reorganization of the Council. In early 1947 Mr. B. A. 
Ohanga, a member of the Luo tribe and a former school master, was 
appointed to the vacancy created by the resignation of Archdeacon 
Beecher Who had represented African interests since 1943. The Rev-
erend Archdeacon recommended to the Governor that African representa-
tion be increased to six, a suggestion strongly endorsed by Mr. Mathu, 
the African nominated unofficial representative in the Council. After 
discussions with unofficials in the Legislature the Governor recom-
mended that African representation be increased to 4, one each to 
represent Nyanza Province; Central Province, including Nairobi; 
Coast Province; Rift Valley Province and the remainder of the Colony. 
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Africans would continue to be nominated by the Governor after he is 
advised by the local native councils. 
On April 16, 194r4° the revised proposals for inter-territorial 
organization were voted upon in the Kenya Legislature and accepted 
by a thirty to eight division,41 all Indian, Arab and African members 
voting in opposition. On July 28, 1947 the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies announced in the House of Commons that the inter-territorial 
organization would come into force on January 1, 1948.42 
Thus the question that had so long plagued Kenya was settled 
not in terms of a political union, but merely as a limited administra-
tive one for specific common services. European demands for an 
elected majority in the Legislative Council prevented the Imperial 
Government from the creation of the political union of East Africa 
in 1930. By 1946, political union was not possible because of African 
fears in Uganda and Tanganyika of European settler control or influence. 
Something far less than 'closer union' had to be accepted, but even 
here European unwillingness to accept the principle of equal repre-
sentation made the Imperial Government make important modifications. 
It also demonstrated again to Indian and African leadership the 
dominant role the European settlers had in influencing and in dictating 
public policy. That is the meaning of this "unhappy surrender." 
40. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council Debates, 
16 April, 1947, col. 26. 
41. ~·• 17 April, col. 97. 
42. 441 H.C. Debates 5s, 28 July, 1947, col. 15. 
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The 1947 High CODDnission Order in Council, which became effective 
on January 1, 1948, provided that the Central Legislative Assembly 
should have a life of four years, terminating on December 31, 1951. 
During 1951, however, the Legislative Councils of Uganda, Tanganyika 
and Kenya passed resolutions moving for a continuance of the Assembly 
for an additional four year period "in its existing form and without 
change of function." The necessary provision was made in the East 
Africa (High Commission) (Amendment) Order in Council, 1951, which 
came into operation on 6th December, 1951.43 Effective December 12, 
1956 representation in the Assembly'was broadened and strengthened 
from 24 to 34. The nominated members were increased from 3 to 6 and 
the unofficials from 13 to 20. Two nominated members were appointed 
by each territorial Governor.44 
Parity of Representation - An Irreducible Minimum. There is 
little doubt that the heart of Kenya's political problem is the 
difficult question of representation. The land question, which looms 
large, the color bar, the economic disparity between Europeans and 
Africans--all are important in the Kenya picture. Important social 
and economic reforms could be undertaken without an immediate challenge 
to European dominance in the Legislative Council. However, to maintain 
their position of dominance,or "leadership" as Europeans phrase it, 
it is vital that there the balance in representation between Europeans 
43. Colonial Office, Annual Re ort on the East Africa High Commission, 
~(London: H.M.s.o., 1955 , p. 89. 
44. The Times, December 6, 1956. 
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and non-Europeans be maintained. Europeans argue that any in~rease 
in non-European representation without a comparable increase in their 
representation would be the first step in the swamping of the European 
community. It is for this reason that they have held fast to this 
principle, and even in the present Council of Ministers the principle 
is acknowledged and accepted. In fact, it accounts in large measure 
for the particular type of constitution that Kenya possesses, that 
called multi-racial government. 
During the postwar period the Indian community was weakened 
by internal divisions along religious lines. In 1935 three Indian 
electoral areas had been created, two of which were to return two 
members to the Legislative Council and the other, one member. 
Previously the whole territory had formed one constituency returning 
five Indian members. Temporary legislation was introduced in 1948 
to reserve two of these seats for the Indian Muslims. This legislation 
was reenacted until 1951, when a bill was passed which included a 
separate electoral roll for the Indian Muslims to return two of their 
own representatives. The main reason for the split was perhaps the 
fear on the part of Indian Muslims of being overwhelmed by the numeri-
cally superior Hindu section. The East African Indian National 
Congress opposed the move when it was first demanded in 1946, The 
Congress feared that Indian political representation would be made 
more ineffectual and that this would hinder their demand for a common 
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Indian or Asian-European franchise.45 European leadership in general 
was not unhappy at the prospect of the Indian split. Although the 
Indians posed no great threat, they were constantly pressing for a 
common roll and in a very few instances joined with the Africans in 
opposing certain legislation. With the separate Muslim roll the 
Europeans were able to say that a common roll was impractical because 
the Indian community could not even agree among itself. 
While the splintering of the Indian community indicates the 
unhappy aspects of communal representation, that is, the proliferation 
and parallel development rather than unity; balanced representation or 
parity demonstrates the acuteness of the problem of political repre-
sentation in a multi-racial society. The problem was not manifested 
until 1950 when the Governor announced that the Imperial Government 
intended to appoint further African and Indian representatives to the 
unofficial side of the Legislature. The campaign by the Europeans 
to maintain parity between themselves and the non-Europeans was 
motivated by their intent to retain domination or "leadership," as 
they preferred to call it, over the affairs of' the Colony. ilithout 
45. Mr. A. B. Patel gave two reasons for the Muslim-Hindu split• "A 
large number of voters on the Indian roll did not care to exercise 
their votes on the merits of a candidate and were of~en influenced 
by the caste, religion or section of the candidate concerned. 
That was one of the most unfortunate reasons which created diffi-
culties. And as events in India became worse ••• the candidates 
exploited the situation by appealing to the religion, caste or 
section of the voters, and unfortunately, most of the voters suc-
cumbed to such appeals." Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legis-
lative Council Debates, 13 December, l95l, col. 1026. And 
Rosberg, Communal Representation, Vol. I, p. 349. 
parity, which was their "irreducible minimum, n the attempt to secure 
increasing European influence in the Executive Council (which 
began in the late 1930's and was progressing well) would be to no 
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avail. European attitudes were based on the common belief that their 
domination had to continue. But there was little agreement as to 
the methods to be employed in securing this domination in the face 
of increasing African demands. In June 1948 the Electors' Union 
conference passed a resolution declaring the immediate political 
objective of the European community should be to gain the greatest 
46 possible measure of control over their own affairs. In 1950 the 
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Electors' Union told the 
conference they must steer a course between the extremists and the 
Fabians. ''While all races in Kenya must work together in accord, 
the Europeans and especially the British must be the senior partners."47 
In the Kenya Plan the Union stated: "We oppose those who see self-
government for the African and by the African as a practicable possi-
bility within auy foreseeable future."48 
Two other related factors should be pointed out here, both of 
which made the maintenance of parity a necessity to European leader-
ship. The first was the lingering hope held by the European com-
munity that a union of East and Central Africa was a definite pos-
sibility; the second was the trend of constitutional development in 
Tanganyika, a trend which would threaten ultimate unity. 
46. East African Standard, 25 June, 1948. 
47. Ibid., 16 June, 1948. 
48. The Electors' Union, The 
criticism of the Plan see 
1949. 
Kenya. Plan (Nairobi, 1949). For a 
East Africa and Rhodesia, 27 October, 
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Regarding East and Central African unity, there were some 
inter-territorial meetings with Northern Rhodesia in the middle 
1920 1s, though problems closer to home prevented any really active 
interest. Kenya was throughout this courtship the suitor, Northern 
Rhodesia being somewhat apprehensive at inheriting the multi-racial 
difficulties of Kenya so long as her own native situation was rela-
tively stable. Concerning the other two Central African territories, 
Nyasaland was considered almost entirely bush and valueless, while 
self-governing Southern Rhodesia was clearly not interested. Active 
interest in East and Central unity came in the late 1940's. The 
report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Tanganyika in 1949 
was viewed in Kenya with antagonism and as a threat to the growing 
idea of East and Central African union and the concept of European 
control. In the early part of 1949 the Kenya Electors' Union was 
invited by Sir Godfrey Huggins, the Prime Minister 9f Southern Rhodesia, 
to send an observer to the Victoria Falls Conference, lilich was trying 
to find a basis for Central African unity. This Conference had little 
to do with East and Central African union, although it was a great 
encouragement to the Kenyans who were interested in East and Central 
African uni·on. Consequently when the Tanganyika Government announced 
in December 1949 its proposals for the constitutional reform it was a 
direct challenge to the unionist group in Kenya. These constitutional 
reforms would upset the whole basis of East and Central African unity. 
The Electors' Union announced that they proposed to nfrustrate with 
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all the means in their power the proposed constitutional changes in 
Tanganyika which may mean the end of British rule in that territory."49 
Throughout 1950 the matter of East and Central African unity 
was pushed by the Electors' Union. That the move was not as strong 
as the Union would have one believe is indicated by the precarious 
financial position of the Electors' Union at that time and a drive 
for membership because of falling interest. Additional meetings were 
held between representatives of the East and Central African terri-
tories on a purely informal basis. In early 1952 a meeting was held 
between representatives of the Electors 1 Union and the Tanganyika 
European Council. It was stated that Sir Godfrey Huggins would shortly 
go to the United Kingdom to press for arrangements for a Central 
African Federation and a conference to be held in London during the 
summer of 1952. It was thought necessary that the six territories 
should agree on a common statement of principles to be presented to 
the London conference if union was to be successful at all. There is 
no record that such a common statement was presented to the London 
Conference. It appears, however, that two factions were involved in 
the move for East and Central African unity: the one represented at 
the meeting mentioned above and the other, perhaps the dominant, 
represented by the Executive Committee of the Electors' Union. The 
reason for this is the watered-down statement of policy made in the 
Annual Report of the Electors' Union in June 1952. Contrasted to the 
49. See the Electors' Union Annual Report 1951-52, pp. 11, 31. 
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above suggestion this official statement read, under the caption of 
'East and Central African Policy,' "The promotion of greater under-
standing and cooperation between the East and Central and South 
African Territories and so far as is practicable to act in concert 
with them."50 This latter group held that it would be wise to wait and 
see the outcome of Sir Godfrey's plan for Central African Federation 
before any ~her action was taken. 
With the advent of the emergency in the fall of 1952 the idea 
of an East and Central African Federation faded into the background. 
A proposal was made to the Electors' Union Annual conference in 
September 1952 stating that the Union should not become preoccupied 
with East and Central African Federation to the detriment of a strong 
constitutional position for Kenya. Though this proposal was not 
formally adopted, the feeling of the Conference seemed to indicate 
that this was the correct tack to be followed. With the formation 
of the Central African Federation in 1953 the issue was ended. 
The Electors' Union 1953 Annual Report closed the issue with the 
phrase "EaQt and Central African Federation will be under continual 
observation."51 
50. Electors' Union, Annual Report 1951-52, p. 31. 
51. The Electors' Union, Annual Report 1952-53, p. 16. The back-
ground of this East and Central unity move is taken from the 
minutes and proceedings of the Electors' Union collected by 
Dr. Rosberg while in Kenya and on deposit at the African Research 
and Studies Program of Boston University. 
Several observations may be made regarding East and Central 
African unity, and the question of parity. Initially Sir Godfrey 
Huggins • though not overly receptive to the move • was sympathetic. 
This was sufficient encouragement to interested groups in Kenya. 
When the Central African Federation became a distinct possibility 
it was obvious that Kenya or East Africa in general would be a 
detriment with its multi-racial problems and economic poverty. 
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Sir Godfrey, it is'known, had a difficult time uniting the three 
Central territories; there is little evidence to show that he had 
much interest in East and Central unity at the same time. Perhaps 
the determining factor in this whole picture is the sentiment in 
the Colonial Office either for or against the larger federation. 
Empirically evaluated, the little available evidence seems to indi-
cate that the Colonial Office was opposed to a large multi-racial 
federation. 
Parity became a major issue when in 1950 the Governor announced 
an impending change in the Legislative Council of Kenya. The European 
community stood firm on parity because of the inroads the Africans 
had already made in their constitutional position and as mentioned 
above any imbalance would thwart both Executive infiltration and the 
then possibility of East and Central African unity. After visiting 
Kenya in the spring of 1951 the Secretary of state for the Colonies 
announced in the House of Commons on May 31, 1951 that no major changes 
would now be made. 52 He would, however • appoint within twelve months 
52. H.C. Debates, 5s, 31 May, 1951, col. 408. 
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or the beginning of the next session or the Legislative Council in 
May, 1952, a commission representing all the communities or Kenya 
with a neutral chairman from outside Kenya to plan constitutional 
development. The main proviso was the understanding that ultimate 
control was to remain with the Imperial Government. He proposed 
interim adjustments, maintaining parity, although personally not 
endorsing it, in which African membership would be increased from 
4 to 6; Indian from 5 to 6; European from 11 to 14. The official 
side would be raised from 16 to 26 to avoid any great disparity. 
The latter members would be expected to support Government on a 
motion or confidence when called upon to do so, otherwise they were 
free to vote in any way they saw fit. 
The members or the new Legislative Council took their seats 
in June, 1952, arter the May General Elections. The unofficial 
members numbered 28; 21 were elected (14 Europeans, 6 Asian, 1 Arab) 
and 7 were representative members (6 Africans and 1 Arab), The 
official side or the Council numbered 26, composed or 8 ex officio, 
8 official nominated members and the 10 new nominated official members. 
This latter group, the nominated cross-bench members, were made up 
of 6 Europeans, 1 Arab, 2 Africans and 1 Indian. The policy of the 
Government of Kenya was defined in a detailed statement on May 23, 
1952, the cross-bench members assuming their seats on the basis or 
this statement. 53 
53. "Kenya Government Statement of May 23, 1952," reproduced in 
Opportunity in Kenya. A Report to the Fabian Colonial Bureau, 
Research Series No, 162 (London, 1953), Appendix 4, 
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In summary it should be noted that the proposed conference of 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies to take place in 1953 was 
postponed because of the declaration of the emergency in late 1952. 
This was unfortunate because major constitutional questions, particu-
larly the problem of representation, would continue to be a source 
of political conflict in Kenya. The postwar period up to the time 
of the emergency saw significant changes in Kenya: the creation of 
a membership system in 1945, European attempts to achieve Executive 
control, the solidification of the policy of parity of representation 
along with the failure of an inept attempt to achieve East and Central 
African unity. African representation was increased in this period 
While Indian representation was weakened by the split along religious 
lines. On balance it may be said that the European position was also 
weakened during this period, shown not only by the lack of unity 
of purpose but more tangibly by the proliferation of the European 
community in the period to follow. The Electors' Union's sudden rise 
in the postwar era was reversed after 1950 and as a political organi-
zation suffered the most by the European proliferation. It served 
a useful purpose, though, as a vehicle for developing and presenting 
settler opinion. If one single element could be cited as the moti-
vating factor behind European actions in this period it might well 
be the growing potential of African strength. Merely observing the 
constitutional scene it would appear that no dramatic change had 
taken place aside from the increase in African representation; 
however, the events in the postwar period were rapidly changing the 
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political environment. European leadership was becoming increasingly 
aware of the potential represented by incipient African nationalism 
and the danger of a nationalist movement to their favorable political 
position in the Colony. Thus by 1952, European opinion began 
seriously to diverge over methods to meet this challenge. 
The nature and importance of this political regrouping of 
the European community is the main subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V - POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE EMERGENCY 
European Disunity, Though 1952 saw the retirement of Governor 
Sir Philip Mitchell and declaration of the emergency on October 21, 
it was a relatively inactive year as far as political advancement 
was concerned, The Electors' Union heard motions to merge the Union 
with the European Elected Members Organization and to have the latter 
responsible to the Union. This was more a device to save the falter~ 
ing Electors' Union than a move from strength. It did, however, 
find some active support, for in July 1952 a detailed statanent of 
policy for a proposed Kenya Party was drawn up with an elaborate 
diagram to show the place and function of the organization, It 
was not a clandestine move but rather a realization on the part of 
a sector of European leadership in the Union that unless the Dela-
mere dream of complete unity within the settler group was maintained 
and strengthened there would be no possibility of gaining the needed 
control of the elective instruments of government. 
A Coordinating Committee of the Electors' Union was set up 
early in 1953 to consider further the merger of the Union and the 
European Elected Members Organization. Little progress was made in 
this direction because the Elected Members were the center of 
criticism in the prosecution of the emergency, The majority of the 
Union, however, was adamant in turning their organization into a 
disciplined political party, Since this was not the view of the total 
membership, a splinter group broke with the Union and formed itself 
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into the Kenya Empire Party under the leadership of Major A. G. Keyser, 
a former European Elected Member. This embryonic party took an extreme 
position on issues, maintaining the right of Europeans to share in 
exercising the trust for the natives and gaining home rule for Kenya 
under the European settler group. 54 Toward the latter part of 1953 
the Kenya Empire Party attempted a merger with the Kenya Protectionist 
Association. During 1953 some of the leaders of the Electors' 
Union continued to seek out some way by Which the political activities 
of the Union could be coordinated with those of the Elected Members. 
This group decided upon a common secretariat for the two organizations 
and a new name for the Electors' Union. It was to be called the 
"Kenya Convention." Their success was to be limited. 
In late 1953 the Elected Members issued a set of nine policy 
statements that was printed and published some months later.55 It 
was, on the whole, a moderate statement of policy, considering the 
gravity of the times. It bore the imprint of the leader of the 
European Elected Members, Mr. Michael Blundell, and was generally 
interpreted as a rapprochement with the other races rather than a 
drive for white domination. The issuance of this policy statement 
caused an immediate split, as was expected. The so-called 'die-hards' 
withdrew from the Electors' Union to form a new party, the White High-
lands Party. The leaders included Major B. P. Roberts, a Nyanza farmer, 
54. See the Institute of Current World Affairs, Letter, Nairobi, 
9-16-53 • P• 6 
55. The European Elected Members' Organization, A Policy statement, 
Nairobi, 1953. 
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who was the chairman of the United Kenya Protection Association, and 
Mr. Leo Vigar, a Nairobi contractor and publisher of Comment, a 
weekly magazine which expounds his 'Malanist' views. Vigar had been 
organizing the Kenya Empire Party. Now both this and Roberts 1 
party were to merge into the White Highlands Party. The policy of 
the Highlands Party was a form of apartheid, a division of Kenya 
into white and black territories with a self-governing and separate 
Highlands. 56 
The other communi ties were not silent during this period of 
European reorganization. The Kenya Indian Congress issued their 
statement of policy in September, generally critical of the European 
statement. It reiterated the regular claims of a common roll, no 
discrimination and ultimate self-government within the Commonwealth. 
A bid was inserted which indicates a new Indian position. It desires 
to cooperate with the 'other racial groups' for the benefit of all 
races. Instead of opposing European demands outright • this appears 
to be a desire to share formal power with the Europeans in exercising 
the native trust. The African Unofficial Members' Organization met 
in December 1953, and issued a policy statement which was composed 
of moderate demands. They emphasized, however, the need for land 
adjustment, education and a direct African election. The Central 
Sikh Association also met in December and presented demands for 
separate Sikh representation on all the Government and local bodies. 
56. Verbatim notes taken in Kenya by Dr. Rosberg, 1954. 
In addition the statement pressed for the opportunity for Sikh 
youth to serve in the military forces of Kenya and to advance to the 
commissioned ranks. 
Lyttelton Constitution. The growing disunity among European 
leadership after 1952 was caused by the different approaches of 
various leaders to the problem of protecting and expanding European 
political power. The emergency contributed to this division in 
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forcing leaders to take definite positions vis-a-vis the Government. 
All groups were concerned with the maintenance of European dominance • 
but some believed that this objective could be best accomplished by 
cooperating with Government by assuming positions of authority in 
the Executive. others, such as the Kenya Empire Party • later merged 
into the Federal Independence Party, favored some form of a modified 
apartheid policy. Still other leaders regretted the formation of 
different European parties and believed that this destruction of 
European unity and solidarity would seriously weaken European political 
power. Basically, however, the essential division was between those 
leaders who believed that the European community could not hold their 
power if they continued to act essentially as a parliamentary opposi-
tion group to Government, and those who sought a complete revision of 
the Constitution which would grant them over-all control. The former 
group had within their ranks the majority of the Elected Members, and 
they were concerned with formulating some plan whereby they could 
control Executive positions while still not giving up their· position 
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of being direct representatives of their community. 
By the end of 1953, it was becoming very clear to Government 
that some method of associating Europeans with policy had to be found. 
Government was exposed to serious criticism from European leadership, 
and Government sought a method by Which European leadership could 
share in the responsibility for its decisions. However, provision 
had to be made for the representation of other groups. Thus some 
constitutional arrangements had to be introduced which would grant 
Europeans important roles of Governmental leadership while at the 
same time not pass any effective political power to the African or 
Asian • The answer was found in the Lyttel ton C onsti tuti on. However, 
when the Secretary of State for the ~olonies visited Kenya in March, 
1954, various European groups had plans prepared as to how they believed 
constitutional reorganization should be undertaken. The proposals 
of the Secretary of State for the Colonies reviewed these, but pro-
posed something new. That further contributed to the marked divisions 
of the European population. 
In January 1954 a Parliamentary Delegation visited Kenya. 57 
The Delegation suggested among other things that the Governor appoint 
to the Executive Council representatives of all the main races to 
assume responsibility for appropriate portfolios. On February 18 
the Electors' Union recommended to the Governor that a War Cabinet 
should immediately be formed to take complete charge of the prosecution 
57. Parliamentary Delegation to Kenya (Cmd. 9081) (1954). 
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of the emergency. In addition an outer Cabinet composed of other 
races would handle administrative work concerning their own races. 
Several days prior to Mr. Oliver Lyttelton's visit to Kenya, discussions 
were carried on at an Electors' Union meeting, outlining what would 
be acceptable to the Union should the Colonial Secretary present 
definite proposals: no basic constitutional change would be tolerated 
until the end of the emergency. a War Council was essential, and any 
proposals forthcoming would have to be fully discussed before the 
Union in conference and if necessary put to the voters for a test. 
Mr. Michael Blundell. leader of the European Elected Members•Organi-
zation, announced at the same meeting that it was lamentable that the 
Elected Members were split on the issue of other races in the cabinet. 
This split was based predominantly on the unwillingness of some 
European Elected Members to have any Indian representatives in 
Executive positions. He favored limited cooperation with Asians and 
Africans in Government but these two races should not be represented 
on any proposed Cabinet. On the day of Mr. Lyttelton's visit the 
Union presented an elaborate plan to him, embracing an Inner Cabinet 
composed of the Deputy Governor. three Members with portfolios, a 
secretariat and three Members without portfolio, all Europeans. The 
Colonial Secretary spent several days in the Colony and discussed the 
constitutional situation with various groups, indicating that he 
would present his proposals to the Elected Members' Organization and 
the other racial representatives within three days. On the 9th of March 
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Mr. Lyttelton gave his proposals in detail to the representatives, 
stating categorically that he wanted an affirmative or negative answer 
to his proposals that very dayl Despite the argument of the members 
that they must consider the matter with their constituents, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies stood firm. The European and 
Asian representatives accepted what came to be known as the "Lyttel-
ton Constitution." It altered the political structure of Kenya by 
the introduction of a Council of Ministers as the principal instrument 
of Government, even though final authority and responsibility within 
the territory still rested with the Governor, who in turn is responsible 
to the Secretary of state for Colonies. The Council of Ministers 
consists of fourteen members, six of them unofficial. The latter are 
dra'llll from the membership of the Legislative Council. Three are 
elected Europeans, two are elected Asians and one is a nominated 
African representative.58 
The Electors' Union in a meeting shortly after acceptance of 
the Lyttelton plan criticized many points put forth, but in the end 
58. Proposals the Secretary of State for Colonies for a Reconstruc-
tion of the Government of nya, March 9, 1954. ovision was also 
made for not more than five and not less than three Under Secretaries, 
of whom one would be an Arab and two would be Africans. The Con-
stitution was to be regarded as experimental until the next General 
Election (September, 1956). If at this election the electorate 
(European and Asian) return members who are willing to serve as 
Members of the Govermnent, there will be no further change in the 
proportions of members of the Legislative Council or the Council of 
Ministers, either as between the main racial groups or as between 
Officials and Unofficial&, before 1960. The British Government 
also agreed not to initiate any changes in the COJmllunal basis of the 
franchise, until 1960. But if this Constitution proves unworkable, 
i.e., if members are elected who refuse to accept posts in Govern-
ment, the Imperial power may revert to the Constitution of 1952 
and take other constitutional action that may be necessary." 
Rosberg, "Struggle for Power in Kenya," P• 4. 
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endorsed it in principle, terming it a fait accompli and suggesting 
endorsement by the European community, cautioning them to watch the 
Council carefully and point out its failings where they appear. The 
Council of Ministers was formally organized on April 20, 1954 with 
mixed reactions in the different sectors of the Kenya population. 
Mr. Blundell accepted the plan fully and took it upon himself to 
convince the people of its worth. In essence Mr. Blundell became 
the unofficial spokemnan for Government policy. During the spring 
and early summer extremist groups pushed two separate plans, one for 
a regional type of government in the highlands and another for a 
federal system of government embracing all of Kenya. In early July 
the Council of Ministers issued a statement of policy containing 
eighteen points, including economic, social and political advancement 
for all ~communities. This was a modest multi-racial docmnent and did 
not envisage any radical refonns in Kenya. The spirit of reconcilia-
tion and statesmanship in the doctonent were more important than what 
was proposed. The Electors' Union countered two days later with their 
own statement of policy. Later the same month Mr. Blundell formed 
the United Country Party, devoted to furthering the system of multi-
racial government. The balance of 1954 saw intermittent criticism 
and praise for the Council of Ministers. Aside from an abortive 
move to re-form the Convention of Associations late in the year, 
Kenya appeared to have entered on a new phase of political life. 
" 
60 
Despite the improvement of the military situation during 
1955. there was little active or forceful "politicking" in Kenya. 
All communities seemed to have adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward 
the Council of Ministers. although some extreme elements were pressing 
their demands and the moderates appeared to be jockeying for position. 
The Federal Independence Party opposed the Lyttelton plan and 
proposed that Kenya be divided into 5 provinces: 1 European • with 
all cities and major townsJ 1 Arab on the CoastJ 3 African. There 
was no objection to the franchise in African provinces. A central 
legislature would seat Europeans only.59 Along this same line a sug-
gestion was made by a committee composed of all European political 
parties that a multi-state federal scheme be enacted in which Kenya 
and Tanganyika would unite with the Central African Federation. This 
super state would also be divided into European. Asian and African 
provinces. The proposed date was 1960. However. this declaration 
came to nothing, and no responsible leadership took it seriously. 
Minor changes were made in the Council of Ministers when in 
July 1955 Mr. F. w. Cavendish-Bentinck retired and Mr. Blundell moved 
from Minister without portfolio to Minister for Agriculture. A split 
occurred in the African representative community over the appointment 
of the African Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture. 
When Mr. Ohanga, Minister for Community Development, and Mr. J. Jeremiah, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry for Local Government, refused 
59. Africa Digest, Vol. II. No.7. Jan.-Feb •• 1955, PP• 13-16. 
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to resign, three African unoffieials formed a new organization without 
them. Distinct from this was the Government's granting permission 
for African political parties to form. These, however, would be 
restricted to local areas and no national organization would be allowed. 
Also Government introduced the appointment of tribal chiefs in the 
urban areas, which seems to imply the continued determination of 
Government to prevent any unity of action developing among the various 
tribal groups of Kenya. There had been no African parties since the 
proscription of the Kenya African Union, a predominantly Kikuyu 
group. 
With the conditions of the emergency continually improving, 
a greater number of moderate Europeans became aware of the fact that 
Africans were permanently associated with them in the government of 
the Colony. This was a Blow and crucial development in European 
thought which would be tested in the 1956 general election. The signs 
of African participation in all phases of Kenya life were ample. 
Aside from the formation of political parties and pressure groups. 
like the Nairobi District African Congress, there was the position of 
Africans in the Kenya F'ederation of Labour. African leaders of the 
labor movement grew in stature in the eyes of all communities when 
they demonstrated moderation and even cooperation in ending mass 
strike movements. 
The results of the 1956 general election, which was to indicate 
European reaction to the Lyttelton plan, were initially foreboding. 
62 
Eight seats were won by the Independent group which favored modifica-
tion of the plan; six seats were won by the United Country Party which 
stood solidly behind the Lyttelton constitution. Extremist groups 
won no seats, nor did the Capricorn Africa candidates. Added to this 
picture was the move by African members who withdrew from the 
Unofficial Members 1 Organization becaus.e of the victory of the Inde-
pendent group who favor the abolition of Asian and African Ministerial 
portfolios. Kenya in general was therefore surprised when the European 
Elected Members announced shortly after the election that they had 
agreed to discard all group and party affiliations in order to work 
together to achieve moderate and constructive policies for the country. 
They simultaneously advised the Governor of the appointment of three 
unofficial European Ministers. Thus the initial testing period of 
the Lyttelton constitution resulted in European acceptance. The 
election showed that a large number of Europeans were agreeable to 
the association of other races in the principal instrument of government, 
the Council of Ministers. On October 19, 1956 a joint statement was 
issued on behalf of the European Elected Members, the Asian Muslim 
Blected Members, the Arab Eleoted Member, and the African Representative 
Members suggesting significant constitutional changes. These unani-
mous recommendations by the unofficial members of the legislature 
were warmly welcomed by the Government and immediately accepted by 
the Secretary of State for Colonies. so Basically these changes would 
so. See African World, December, 1956, pp. 23-24, 
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increase the Council of Ministers from 6 to 8 (one African and one 
European) and increase the Legislative Council by four, including 
2 Africans. The present make-up of the Legislative Council (Febru-
ary 1957) is shown below: 
European: 
President 
Vice President and Speaker 
6 ex officio Ministers 
2 nominated Ministers 
4 unofficial Ministers 
13 nominated Members 




2 nominated Members 





2 nominated Members 
~representative Members 
10 
1 in Council of Ministers 
1 nominated Member 
1 elected Member 
3 
Plus two Corporate Members who may be of any race, yet to be appointed. 
The Official Members are the President, Vice-President, 1~ Ministers 
and 18 Nominated Members. (Although 8 Ministers will be answerable 
to the electorate, as Ministers they will rank as officials of the 
Government while in office.) The Unofficial Members are the Elected 
Representatives and Corporate Member~ (African Representative Members 
will be elected as from Maroh, 1957. 1 
61. Africa Digest, Vol. IV, No. 4, P• 120 
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CHAPrER VI - SOME CONCLUDING OBSEHVATIONS 
Postwar political problems in Kenya can clearly be observed 
in the issues which concern the method and nature of the system 
of representation. Involved in this problem is the achievement 
of a balance between majority and minority interests. In contrast 
with the prewar nature of this problem, when the conflict of 
interest was essentially between only the European and Asian, the 
postwar problem has taken on new dimensions in the demands by Afri-
cans for an effective role in the central institutions of the 
Government. Asian political influence has bean declining with the 
increasing political effectiveness of African leadership, and the 
basic struggle for political power is to be seen in European 
attempts to consolidate and even expand their present political 
role and in the African's increasing ability to bring pressure for 
major political change. Contributing to and conditioning the 
postwar political situation has been a rapid acceleration in social 
and economic change and greater willingness on the part of the 
British Government to provide funds for African development. 
The "Lyttelton" constitution, though mainly an extension 
of the "ministerial system" introduced in 1945, does provide at 
least a framework for multi-racial participation in the exercise 
of public policy. These constitutional arrangements represent the 
need to associate Africans, as well as Europeans, with Government, 
even though the African's role is limited relative to the European's. 
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It does not, however, provide a solution to the problems inherent 
in communal representation. That system of representation continues 
to be the mode of selection of representatives as Ministers, and 
the principle of European parity has also been accepted, at least 
until 1960, as the method of allocating the number of ministerial 
posts each ethnic group will have. Though the Council of Ministers 
recognizes the principle of collective responsibility, the system 
of communal representation adopted in the selection of Ministers 
fails to provide a method of achieving any common territorial 
responsible outlook. Actually, the Council functions more like a 
coalition, the divisions of which are not a result of party interest, 
but dictated by the ethnic considerations and the distribution 
and relative power structure of each group. 
The Council of Ministers as a principal instrument of 
government developed from the increasing influence of the non-
official representatives in the Legislative Council. This increase 
in the Share of governmental authority has been the result of 
European settler pressure for greater responsibility and control 
over a period of years. Afrioan leadership in the postwar period 
has been pressing for greater participation in central government, 
and has sought to achieve a major position in government with 
possible ultimate complete control. Asian leadership, though 
politically weakened by religious divisions, seeks to protect its 
" 
legitimate interests in a rapidly changing political situation. 
The European leadership group proposes to maintain their present 
political role as a very minimum. Their former conflicts with 
Great Britain have given way to a system of informal alliances 
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with the Imperial Government in order to protect their dominant 
position in Kenya political life. Moderate Europeans agree that 
their dominant position can not be maintained for more than two 
decades. Such a position presumes a working and cooperative arrange-
ment with the Imperial Govermnent in which European efforts toward 
self-government are abandoned and replaced by European leadership 
seeking to uphold British authority in Kenya. In the long run 
European leadership must meet the increasing demands for effective 
participation. If a Labour Government were to be elected, and 
its policy of numerical democracy extended to Kenya, the European 
position would be seriously threatened. 
The Africans presently desire Imperial control because they 
realize they are unable to staff and govern the country alone. 
Further, they fear any extension of authority at this time would 
only contribute to European political dominance. 
African nationalism is a potential source of African political 
power and a direct threat to European dominance. Development has 
been slow to the present because of the few educated men who sought 
or were able to act as a national elite, the essentially tribal 
character of political developments, and the negative character of 
such movements. With the emergence of a trans-tribal elite made 
67 
up of educated leaders of several tribes who have found positions 
of leadership in trade union movements and the embryonic District 
African Congresses, the necessity of territorial political coopera-
tion has become apparent, although territory-wide African organiza-
tions are not permitted at present. The recent African electoral 
rolls form a basis for African organization, a vehicle for political 
education and the legitimate opportunity for use of African numerical 
strength in the achievement of power. Rapid social and economic 
change will increase the number of Africans who would be susceptible 
to mass mobilization by the emerging elite. 
Europeans appear to have two courses open to them: allowing 
the elites access to positions of prestige and a share in parlia-
mentary authority, or barring access and having the elites mobilize 
the African mass with the possible result of European displacement 
from his present position of dominance. 
Since neither alternative appears to be attractive to the 
European leadership or the electorate and African demands for 
constitutional reform are continually resisted, African leadership 
seems to be exploiting poaaibilities of African nationalism. 
While not attempting to prognosticate, it appears that 
future political action will be polarized into European-African 
conflict. The parallel development of the two communities could 
not be upset by the Asian third force because of its weakness. It 
is up to the British government to find transitional institutional 
arrangements which will divert present parallel development into a 
channel of peaceful change. The basis of such a political arrange-
ment must be sought in a solution to the difficult issues of repre-
sentation and franchise. 
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To work towards a solution, it is doubtful that fundamental 
progress may be made until the specific goal of the political future 
of the territory is defined. The apparent polarization of conflict 
in Kenya brings into question whether a colonial policy of empiri-
cism is adequate to cope with the complex problem of a multi-racial 
territory, particularly when the forces of change and resistance 
become increasingly even. As the Royal East Africa Commission 
argued concerning the need for a definitive economic and social 
goal for East Africa, one coul~ argue for a defined political goal 
with a planned procedure by which it can be achieved. 
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APPENDIX I - LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN KENYA 
Formal organization of Local Native Councils began in 1924. 
Prior to this a limited authority system was attempted by the Village 
Headman's Ordinance of 1902 with subsequent changes in 1908 and the 
Native Authority Ordinance of 1912. The Local Native Councils or, 
as they are called today • the African District Councils • were a major 
step forward, They grew out of native Councils of Elders, a familiar 
institution in the chiefless tribes of Kenya, The Local Native 
Councils consist of the District Commissioner, the District Officer, 
if there is one, and the local appointed chiefs. This latter group 
are usually chosen from a list presented to the District Commissioner 
by local natives. Local councils are subject to the central govern-
ment through the Minister for Local Govermnent. (See Chart I) 
Another link with central government is through the District Com-
missioner, who is under the Provincial Commissioner. The latter is 
in charge of one of the six provinces into which Kenya is di.vided, 
and is himself under the Minister for African Affairs. 
It should be noted that in Kenya there are two distinct local 
government systems: African Local Government and European Local 
Government, In African areas there have been Local Native Councils, 
or African District Councils, since 1924, as stated above. In the 
Highlands, District Councils on which all the members were Europeans 
were established in 1928, 
Urban Government in Kenya 
Municipalities. Nairobi became a city by royal charter in 
1950. It is the governmental and financial capital of Ke~va and the 
rail headquarters for the whole colony. It is the only center in 
Kenya that is classified a city. The city of Nairobi and the 
municipality of Nakuru are both administered by municipal councils, 
and Mombasa, Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale by municipal boards. Asian 
and African members serve on all councils and boards. 
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Townships and District Councils. Urban areas smaller than a 
municipality are townships. They may be administered by (1) a District 
Commissioner responsible for the township; or (2) a council of 
inhabitants which advises the District Commissioner, who is not 
obliged to follow oouncil suggestions. Only two district councils 
remain out of the seven which existed before the introduction of the 
county council system. These are the Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu 
District Councils. 
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County Councils. Although Chart I illustrates the functional 
breakdown of Kenya local government it does not consider the actual 
operation of modern, local government under the County Council system. 
It was apparent that the system described in Chart I had many 
shortcomings. In 1952 an effort was made to fill an important gap 
in this system, i.e., the European District Councils did not cover as 
wide an area as the African District Councils; nor did they charge a 
local rate until 1946. Five county councils are established under 
the Local Government (County Councils) Ordinance of 1952. These five 
were for the Nairobi, Nakuru and Naivasha areas in 1953, for Aberdare 
in 1954, and Nyanza area in 1955. They would correspond roughly to 
the African District Councils, whose position in the African Reserves 
would be unaffected; likewise they would be in authority over the 
District Councils. The six municipalities mentioned above are included 
in this system of County Council government. Chart II shows the present 
picture of local goverlllll8nt s 
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Chart III is a typical County Council arrangement: 
i B : A c 
\ I I 
I I m I --- -- ---
I! I 
I I t 
I I -
I I D 
I ~ udc 
I 1 -
All the area enclosed in the large rectangle is controlled by a County 
Council except for ~which represents a municipality; udc represents an 
Urban District Council; ! are townships. The small rectangles divided 
by broken lines represent four different Rural District Councils, i.e., 
* A, B, C, D. 
African District Councils. There are 24 African district 
councils governed by the provisions of the African District Councils 
Ordinance of 1950, which replaced earlier legislation. The councils 
are bodies corporate and have powers similar to other local authorities 
including: construction and ~intenance of roads, public health, 
housing, animal husbandry, social welfare. Revenues are derived from 
poll rates on adult male Africans, cesses on agricultural produce, land 
rents and royalties and fees for services and licenses issued. 
*Adapted from Marsh and Kingsnorth, An Introduction to the History of 
East Africa, listed in the bibliography; and Kenya Colonial Reports 
~. London, H.H.s.o., 1956. 
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Locational Councils provide scope for local government on a smaller 
scale within the African district council areas. The members are 
for the most part elected by the residents in the locations concerned. 
Since 1955 Locational Councils have a statutory existence which pro-
vides them with a legal constitution and powers as local government 
units, subordinate to the African district council within whose area 
of jurisdiction they lie. 
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APPENDIX TV - TRICHOTOMIC AFRICA 
This appendix describes Trichotomic Africa~ a relatively 
new way of looking at the totality of sub-Saharan Africa and pointing 
up the significance of Kenya. 
Since the advent of the social scientist in this area has 
been relatively recent and the field of work so immense, theories 
of studying the territory have been few and ephemeral. This is 
especially true in the field of political science. Nevertheless, 
considerable thought on the matter of African political development 
is emerging in this country. New concepts are being thought out, 
tested as well as possible, modified, discarded and in some cases 
used as the basis for still newer ideas. 
One accepted way of looking at sub-Saharan Africa is in 
terms of emerging states. This is an arbitrary classification of 
territories. One category unites independent or near independent 
units such as Ghana, Liberia, Ethiopia, the Sudan; another category 
allows for emerging African. states, for example, Nigeria and Uganda; 
a third classification is the so-called multi-racial grouping which 
includes Kenya, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika. :i:'he 
bases for dividing the area appear to be the arbitrary political 
divisions established in the nineteenth century grab for African 
*The idea is that of Dr. Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. of the African Research 
Program of Boston University; the appellation is mine. I am indebted 
to Dr. Rosberg for discussing this particular aspect with me and 
allowin~ me to use it here. It should, perhaps, be further stated 
that th1s is a new concept in the first stages of development and 
has not been refined or tested, nor has it been subjected to the 
critical examination of Africanist colleagues. 
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colonies by leading metropolitan powers. This viewpoint does not 
consider inter-territorial unity evidenced by similarity of economic, 
cultural, social or demographic conditions or in a broad sense, 
geopolitical factors, In using emergent statehood as a basis for 
analysis, artificial barriers are perpetuated at a time when change 
in Africa tends toward large political units rather than the continu-
ation and/or proliferation of small units, This is shown by the 
recent federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, the voluntary 
union of Togoland with the Gold Coast • the virtual annexation of 
South-West Africa by the Union of South Africa, and the new greater 
Somalia movement. l:he preoccupation with closer union among the 
three territories of East Africa since 1920, based partly on the 
idea that they would form a multi-racial bulwark against total African 
encroachment • was disrupted with the formal annotmcement that Uganda 
was to develop as a purely African state under African leadership. 
The artificially created units cannot survive in tact under the 
pressure of dynamic change. 
Emerging statehood was a useful basis for analysis in the 
first half of this century • but in the post World ilar II period 
change has been so rapid and unpredictable that new concepts for 
studying sub-Saharan Africa are required. "Trichotomic Africa" is 
an innovation which looks at the totality of sub-Saharan Africa in 
an entirely different way by taking into consideration the direction 
of recent trends in Africa away from territorial entities toward 
geopolitical blocs Which are united not only by cultural, demographic 
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and political similarities, but also by modern industrial expansion 
in an export-oriented economy. J:he essence of trichotomic Africa 
is depicted in the following map. Simply stated, it considers 
sub-Saharan Africa as divided into three parts: The northern belt, 
which encompasses Uganda, stretches from the Guinea coast on the 
west to the Indian Ocean on the east. It is characterized by 
limited European settlement and commercial penetration, a distinct 
lack of industry, Islamic predominance, rapid political change, 
the problems of federalism and emerging independent states under 
African control, and trained African leadership which finds a voice 
in the Afro-Asian bloc. The southern belt includes the white-
dominated Union of South Africa and Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland plus the other territories shown on the map. In this area 
there is limited challenge by the indigenous people to white domi-
nation. other characteristics of this area are primary extractive 
industry, rapidly developing secondary and terciary industrial 
growth, a phenomenally high rate of European immigration in an area 
with a high capacity for absorption, legal protection of the white 
population and limited African contact with a small and circum-
scribed leadership group. It is an area where white supremacy is 
reinforcing itself. 
The middle section, or inter-tropical Africa, is comprised 
of Kenya, Tanganyika and Belgian Congo. The striking element of 
these three territories is the degree of Asian and European convergence 
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and the threat of a potential clash between European and African 
interests. European authority is presently in power, but the authority 
pattern is changing, and it may tend toward that of either the north 
or the south. Kenya is the most critical terri tory, with a Bl!lall 
group of emerging African leaders who look to the north. The white 
element of Kenya, until recently, sought cooperation and outright 
union with the south, as pointed out in the body of the thesis. 
African leadership developed in a large plantation system controlled 
by the white group; limited cash cropping was the only pattern of 
African economic development until quite recently. All the elements 
of a multi-racial society are found in Kenya. Islamic influence, 
though present 1 is not really powerful in Kenya when compared to 
the north, where divisions are predominantly Islamic or non-Islamic. 
Kenya is an area of open stress and strain compared to the relatively 
stable southern third, where European power is not presently in 
jeopardy. Also, self-government is sought in Kenya in the absence 
of internal political unity. Every change and movement on the consti-
tutional scene appears divisive in the eyes of each of the three 
main communities. 
Historically, Kenya has a tradition of white domination 
under the relatively liberal British colonial policy. Tanganyika, 
with its mandate and later trusteeship affiliation was somewhat 
more restricted. In addition to this is the fact that much of the 
interior of Tanganyika is uninhabitable by white settlers because 
of the marginal quality of the soil and the prevalence of Tsetse fly. 
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Belgian colonial policy in the Congo has stressed the social and 
economic development of the indigenous population with no provision 
for political training or thought of eventual political independence. 
Part of the so-called mass awakening of Africa is the realization 
that with social and economic security and the emergence of middle 
class elites, political restiveness is a natural consequence. 
While Tanganyika and the Congo are important from the viewpoint 
of potential development, Kenya is presently engaged in a political 
tug of war where day to day changes may be observed and empirically 
evaluated. Thus the innnediate concern with Kenya. 
This whole idea suggests that the hope and dream of East 
and Central African Federation (which would have united Uganda, 
Kenya and Tanganyika with Nyasaland and the two Rb.odesias) is over. 
The economic backwardness of Kenya, plus its political instability, 
is too great a liability to the 'solid south.' The conception of 
Capricorn Africa is not yet recognized in modern middle Africa. The 
consequence of this is that the Kenya problem must be solved from 
within. The polarization of the north and the south, combined with 
the tenuous position of present white leadership, precludes a formal 
or informal union with the southern bloc. This does not necessarily 
indicate a black-white, north-south antithesis based on skin color. 
For instance, there have been basic changes recently in South African 
policies toward the new African state o:f Ghana. The apartheid-bent 
Union is cooperating with African-governed Ghana for economic reasons 
riv 
in the development of markets and an exchange of technicians. Such 
measures must be mutually beneficial or else they would not be 
undertaken. The industrialization of the south and the expansion 
of its export-oriented economy permits no color bar where practical 
business is concerned. Not unrelated to this is the rapid and 
realistic changes in French policy in the direction of more local 
power and authority within a large French African Union. 
Middle Africa, then, has characteristics of both the north 
and the south, i.e., industrial development, market economy, white 
plantations, urban development similar to the south, and African 
political movements which are of concern to the European minority. 
A middle way must be found for middle Africa. 
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ABSTRACT 
Great Britain has adopted two definitive yet different 
political goals in Africa, each of which has been controlled in 
large part by the internal situation of the territories. In West 
Africa, colonial policy has granted power of decision to African 
political leadership, while in Central Africa, political authority 
has been given in large measure to the local European minority. 
Contrasted to these two major decisions, Britain has ~ 
adopted specific definitive policy goals for Kenya. The general 
goal of self-government is too vague to be meaningful to the different 
members of its disparate multi-racial population. The immediate 
question is "self-government for whom?" To what racial or ethnic 
group does the 'self' refer? In West Africa it certainly meant 
Africans and in Central Africa it has meant Europeans. What accounts 
for the unwillingness of Britain to define specific and immediate 
policies in Kenya? It is believed that an answer to this problem 
through analysis of the internal political and social situation 
will reveal not only the distinct problems that Kenya poses for 
policy, but will suggest that the present policy of traditional 
empiricism may not be able to meet the critical problems of this 
territory. 
The African population has had a minor role in the European-
dominated political, economic and social order in Kenya, as manifested 
by a limited participation in the formal process of central government 
and lack of informal influence in the social order. Economically 
circumscribed by lack of technical skill, educationoand capital, 
the African's participation in the market sector of the economy 
xxii 
is small. The low African wage scale and the poverty of the reserves 
help to maintain economic insecurity and limit social mobility to 
an educated few, Limited social intercourse and non-assimilation 
into the European society prevent access to positions of informal 
influence, The color bar has multiplied the frustrations of the 
elite by limiting access to positions of prestige and wealth. To 
assert himself effectively the African must compete for power in a 
political system alien to him with little command of the prerequi-
sites and techniques of the system. In addition, there is extremely 
little social and political solidarity among Africans on a territorial-
wide level. 
Asian power has been declining in the postwar period in rela-
tion to that of the European and the African. The principal reason 
for this is the system of communal representation which has limited 
the Asian's influence in both the central and local government, 
Membership in councils of government has never been more than half 
that of Europeans and is now about equal to the African number. The 
two ministerial posts presently assigned to Asians in the Council of 
Ministers do not cover significant fields. 
From their initial occupation of the territory Europeans have 
considered themselves political and social elites, the only group that 
should, and from their viewpoint could, exercise authority. With d0cnamic 
leadershic and political victories over the Imperial Government, 
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European belief grew in the feasibility of complete political 
control, fostered in part by the ambivalence of British policy. 
Ultimate control of all Kenya activities lies in the hands of the 
Imperial Goverrunent, and that Goverrunent has stated repeatedly and 
officially that Kenya would obtain self-government. But, as in 
many other parts of the British Dependent Empire, the discrepancy 
between the men on the spot and Whitehall is in the meaning of 
the word eventual, in other words, the timing of what is assured. 
The predominant theme in postwar Kenya politics was the 
institutionalization of the European power position, but another 
unmistakable development was the emergence of limited African 
leadership. European political power had to be more and more con-
cerned with the emergence of African leadership and the potential 
represented by incipient African nationalism. European leadership 
in the postwar period came to the conclusion that the possibilities 
of gaining control of the legislature were limited. The possibility 
of gaining control of the Executive Council offered a fruitful 
avenue of exploration, but it was vital that the system of parity 
of representation between European and non-European interests in 
the Legislative Council be maintained. The issue of parity of 
representation became a major one and plans for European over-all 
control in the Executive Council were abandoned, although not forgotten. 
Parity was intricately associated with the issue of closer union of the 
East African territories. 
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By the end of the emergency a greater number of moderate 
Europeans were becoming aware of the fact that arricans were per-
manently associated with them in the government of the Colony. 
The 'Lyttelton' constitution ushered in a multi-racial ministerial 
government. The 1956 general elections were to test the European 
reception of this multi-racial government. 
It appears that fUture political action will be polarized 
into European-African conflict. The parallel development of the 
two communities could not be upset by the Asian third force because 
of its weakness. It is up to the British government to find transi-
tional institutional arrangements which will divert present parallel 
development into a channel of peaceful change. The basis of such a 
political arrangement must be sought in a solution to the difficult 
issues of representation and franchise. 
To work towards a solution. it is doubtful that fundamental 
progress may be made until the specific goal of the political 
fUture of the territory is defined. The apparent polarization of 
conflict in Kenya brings into question whether a colonial policy of 
empiricimn is adequate to cope with the complex problem of a multi-
racial territory. particularly when the forces of change and 
resistance become increasingly even. As the Royal East Africa 
Commission argued concerning the need for a definitive economic and 
social goal for East Africa. one could argue for a defined political 
goal with a planned procedure by which it can be achieved. 
